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WHAT IF JUSTICE SCALIA TOOK HISTORY
AND THE RULE OF LAW SERIOUSLY?
STEVEN L. WINTER*
The most appealing justifications for current standing law are
that it preserves the separation of powers and protects the democratic
process from the countermajoritarian intrusion of judicial review.1
Both rationales, however, misconceive the relation between our core
conceptions of democracy and the rule of law.  Frank Michelman’s
recent work struggles with the paradox of constitutional democracy,
in which self-rule is pitted against the rule of law as pronounced by an
unelected and unaccountable judiciary.2  Though we cannot escape
this conundrum at the conceptual level, it can nevertheless be dis-
solved at the level of practice.  The place where the conflict between
democracy and the rule of law evaporates is the citizen suit, exempli-
fied in its modern form by Section 1365 of the Clean Water Act.3
From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.4 is more
than a victory for the environment and those who are concerned
about it—though that, too, is of the utmost importance.  In heralding
what appears to be a relative return to sanity in the law of standing,
the decision in Laidlaw strikes a profound blow for a conception of
democracy that is as radical as it is traditional.
Not everyone sees it that way, of course.  In his dissent in Laid-
law, Justice Scalia expresses concern that the majority’s decision
holds “grave implications for democratic governance.”5  His fear is
that the Court’s “new” and “revolutionary” approach to standing
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“[A]llowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of
power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. . . . We
should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit
general oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large
measure insulated, judicial branch.”).
2. See FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g) (1994).
4. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
5. See id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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“will permit the entire body of public civil penalties to be handed
over to enforcement by private interests.”6  One must pause a mo-
ment to marvel at the irony: Private enforcement of civil penalties—
as Justice Scalia has since conceded—has been a staple of Anglo-
American jurisprudence since the fourteenth century.7  These “popu-
lar actions,” Blackstone noted, “were given to the people in general.”8
Both before the American Revolution and after, the so-called in-
former or qui tam actions enabled the ordinary citizen to “see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied.”9  Indeed, in 1805, Chief Justice Marshall
characterized private enforcement as the norm rather than the excep-
tion: “Almost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be
recovered by an action of debt, as well as by information.”10
In his majority opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,11 Justice
Scalia offhandedly dismissed the informer action as the “unusual case
in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the out-
come of a suit against a private party for the Government’s benefit,
by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”12  Let us put
aside for the moment the fact that some informer statutes did not al-
low the litigant to share in the bounty.  (Most did.)  Put aside, too, the
fact that the informer action was not the only means by which a plain-
tiff could sue to vindicate issues of public rights and duties without
having to demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome: under the
English relator practice, as followed by nineteenth century American
courts, any person might seek the prerogative writs of mandamus,
prohibition, and quo warranto to redress the legal injuries of “refusal
or neglect of justice.”13  Put aside, as well, the fact that the Supreme
6. See id. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct.
1858, 1864 (2000) (citing the Statute Prohibiting the Sale of Wares After the Close of Fair, 5
Edw. 3, ch. 5 (1331)); see also 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 240
(1926) (citing 3 Henry 7, ch. 3 (1424)).
8. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160 (emphasis in original).
9. See People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
10. See Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
11. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
12. Id. at 572-73.
13. See Blackstone, supra note 8, at *109.  For more detailed discussions, see Raoul Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818-27
(1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV.
255, 258-61 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 1265, 1270 (1961) (“I have encountered no case before 1807 in which the standing of
plaintiff is mooted, though the lists of the cases in the digests strongly suggest the possibility that
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Court, in 1875, specifically approved of this public rights practice in a
federal mandamus case against the Union Pacific—upholding the re-
lators’ right to sue to enforce a statutory duty despite the railroad’s
argument that they “had no interest other than such as belonged to
others . . . and the duty they seek to enforce by the writ is a duty to
the public generally.”14  Rather, consider the fact that the very exis-
tence of these forms of action undercuts the central notion of modern
standing law (as articulated in cases running from Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Committee to Stop the War15 and United States v. Richardson16
through Lujan and Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment17) that “vindication of the rule of law—the ‘undifferentiated
the plaintiff in some of them was without a personal interest.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor
of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1394-1409 (1988).
For a contrary point of view of the English practice, see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and
the English Prerogative Writs: the Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997).
Clanton’s argument, however, has four principal flaws.  First, and most strikingly, he dismisses
the significance of the English relator practice as  “irrelevant” notwithstanding the relator’s lack
of a personal interest because the King was understood to be the real party in interest.  But this
legal fiction rather begs the question of how unaffected “bystanders” would have standing to
represent the state.  See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing Vermont Agency,
120 S. Ct. at 1861-66).  Second, in canvassing the English relator practice, Clanton does not dis-
tinguish between private rights mandamus cases, where there was a personal interest require-
ment, and public rights mandamus cases, where there was not.  Third, the fact that “strangers”
often had some personal interest in the matter before the court does not establish that a per-
sonal stake was a prerequisite to suit.  Indeed, he often infers a negative (that a stranger who
lacked a personal interest could not sue) solely from the discussion of a positive (the legal status
of a party with an interest in the matter); yet everyone agrees that the courts treated the former
differently than the latter—i.e., one mandatory, the other discretionary.  Fourth, whatever the
antecedent English practices, Clanton does not consider their reception and implementation in
this country where the predominant rule was that:
The question, who shall be the relator . . . depends upon the object to be attained by
the writ.  Where the remedy is resorted to for the purpose of enforcing a private right,
the person interested in having the right enforced, must become the relator. . . .  A
stranger is not permitted officiously to interfere, and sue out a mandamus in a matter
of private concern. But where the object is the enforcement of a public right, the Peo-
ple are regarded as the real party, and the relator need not show that he has any legal
interest in the result.  It is enough that he is interested, as a citizen, in having the laws
executed, and the right in question enforced.
County Comm’rs v. People ex rel. Metz, 11 Ill. 202, 207-08 (1849).  The United States Supreme
Court explicitly endorsed Metz, noting that: “[t]here is . . . a decided preponderance of Ameri-
can authority in favor of the doctrine, that private persons may move for a mandamus to en-
force a public duty, not due to the government as such.”  Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343,
355 (1875).
14. Hall, 91 U.S. at 354-56.
15. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
16. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
17. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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public interest’ in faithful execution of” the law is not the proper
province of the citizen plaintiff.18
For Justice Scalia, democracy and the rule of law require that
private parties not be allowed to invoke the courts’ power to see that
the law is enforced.  Why should this be?  The immediate answer lies
in a highly conventional, though somewhat rigid conception of the
separation of powers.  Courts are unelected and, to that extent, unac-
countable; it follows that the “potent” power of judicial review should
be used sparingly, only when the circumstances “genuinely” call for
it.19  “Any other conclusion,” we are warned, “would mean that the
Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an
Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the
conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal
courts.”20
We are on familiar ground so far.  But what about the intimation
that rule-of-law values counsel against the citizen suit?  Here, Justice
Scalia adds a fillip of his own.  For the more standard ploy is to refer
the would-be citizen plaintiff to the political process: In the familiar
argument, a generalized grievance is by definition more appropriately
the subject of democratic politics.  But his is not the standard argu-
ment.  Rather, Justice Scalia invokes the separation of powers con-
cern of such cases as Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization21 and Allen v. Wright22 that the Executive Branch must be
allowed its prosecutorial discretion.  He cannot rest there, however,
because the point of the Clean Water Act’s citizen-suit provision is
that Congress (remember Congress?) has affirmatively decided that
official enforcement should be supplemented by citizen-initiated suits.
Accordingly, Justice Scalia revives a notion he first floated in Lujan:
that standing doctrine’s concrete injury requirement is equally a mat-
ter of Article II’s command that the President “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”23  “By permitting citizens to pursue civil
18. See id. at 106 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577).
19. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 191-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 179 (majority opinion).
21. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
22. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
23. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577:
If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have
always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undiffer-
entiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individ-
ual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President
to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . .’
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penalties payable to the Federal Treasury,” Justice Scalia observes in
Laidlaw, “the Act . . . turns over to private citizens the function of en-
forcing the law.”24
With this contention, the separation of powers argument has
taken a new turn.  In cases such as Simon, Allen v. Wright, and Lujan
the question of standing is a question whether citizens can invoke the
powers of the Court to intrude on Executive decision-making with re-
spect to how the law should be enforced.  The related concern is that
the courts will become “continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action.”25  Here, in contrast, no such concerns
are at stake.  The courts are not being asked to second-guess any Ex-
ecutive decision; they are being asked only to enforce a statute’s pro-
scription on primary behavior.  The Justice Department, moreover,
retains supervisory authority over the suit—including the power to
take over the suit and to review any settlement.26
But, if the separation of powers argument has taken a new turn,
it is one in which rule-of-law and democratic values ostensibly cohere.
For in arguing that Article II grants the Executive the exclusive power
of law enforcement, Justice Scalia is also arguing that the enforce-
ment of the law should be subject to democratic governance.  His
complaint is that citizen suits go forward “without meaningful public
control.”27  An exclusive power to enforce the law, in contrast, places
that power in Executive officials accountable to the electorate.28  This
24. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In a footnote in his majority opinion in
Vermont Agency, Justice Scalia purported to preserve the Article II argument for the future.
See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1865
n.8 (2000).
25. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
26. Under the Clean Water Act, the government can foreclose a citizen suit by filing its
own action.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994).  And, under § 1365(c)(2), the Administrator
of the EPA can “intervene as a matter of right” if the government opposes a citizen suit.  Simi-
lar safeguards are obtained under the False Claims Act, the statute at issue in Vermont Agency.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(b), (c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
It is not the case, however, that citizen suits have no impact on Executive decision-making:
Clearly, the citizen’s decision to bring a suit abrogates any decision by law enforcement officials
not to prosecute.
27. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. “Elected officials are entirely deprived of their discretion to decide that a given viola-
tion should not be the object of suit at all, or that the enforcement decision should be post-
poned.” Id., at 210 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Under our system of government, the primary check against prosecuto-
rial abuse is a political one.  The prosecutors who exercise this awesome discretion are selected
and can be removed by a President, whom the people have trusted enough to elect.”).
In other contexts, however, Justice Scalia has questioned the Justice Department’s author-
ity to exercise prosecutorial discretion.  See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994)
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argument may appear sound, but there are some problems.  The first
problem is that the Article II argument does not escape the historical
objection: The same informer actions and public mandamus cases that
give the lie to the Court’s Article III jurisprudence also refute the
claim that the Framers intended to give the President sole and con-
clusive authority over the enforcement of the laws.29  Within two
months of assuming their roles as members of the first Congress, the
Framers passed a customs house informer statute.30  A few months
later, they provided for federal jurisdiction over informer suits in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.31
The second problem is that the argument ignores some powerful
instrumental reasons for employing citizen suits as a supplementary
mechanism of enforcement.  For one thing, there is the problem of
limited resources: Neither the Justice Department nor the EPA has
the wherewithal to monitor every discharge from every plant in the
United States.32  For another, there is the problem of capture so fa-
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Executive has the power (whether or not it has the right) effectively
to nullify some provisions of law by the mere failure to prosecute—the exercise of so-called
prosecutorial discretion.”) (emphasis added).
29. This problem has since been noted by the dissent in Vermont Agency.  See 120 S. Ct. at
1878 (“The historical evidence. . . , together with the evidence that private prosecutions were
commonplace in the 19th century, . . . is also sufficient to resolve the Article II question.”)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 45 (informer action against custom col-
lectors who failed to post fee and duty schedules or who overcharged individuals).  Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in Vermont Agency identified another seven such statutes enacted by
the first Congress: Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124-25 (action by author or proprietor
for penalty for violation of copyright); Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 6, 1 Stat. 102 (action by cen-
sus taker for penalty for failure to cooperate); Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102 (in-
former action for failure to file census return); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131,
133 (action for carriage of seamen without contract or illegal harboring of runaway seamen);
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137-38 (action for forfeiture of goods used in unlicensed
trade with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209 (informer action for viola-
tion of spirits duties); Act. Of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16, 17, 1 Stat. 116 (informer action in cases
of larceny or receipt of stolen goods).  See 120 S. Ct. at 1865 nn.5-6.
31. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (authorizing federal district court
jurisdiction “of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United
States”).  Other actions with respect to informer suits taken by the early Congresses included:
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 5, 1 Stat. 275, 277 (providing rules for the award of costs in cases
brought by “any informer or plaintiff on a penal statute to whose benefit the penalty or any part
thereof if recovered is directed by law”); Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. 347, 349
(informer action to enforce certain prohibitions on the slave trade); and Act of June 30, 1834,
ch. 161, § 27, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)) (informer action to
enforce regulations with respect to trade with Indian tribes).
32. Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has quoted Justice (and former Attorney General) Jackson’s
observation that:
[N]o prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives complaints.
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miliar from the administrative law and rational choice literature.33
Indeed, Laidlaw itself provides a nice illustration: The company
asked the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control to file a suit against it in order to bar the citizen suit that had
already been threatened.34  The company’s lawyer then drafted the
Department’s complaint, and the company paid the Department’s
filing fee.35  Just one day before the citizen suit could be filed, the De-
partment and the company settled the enforcement suit for a paltry
$100,000 in civil penalties.36
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the Article
II argument—one that derives directly from the rule-of-law ideal it-
self.  Ours is “a government of laws, and not of men.”37  But, what
does that mean?  The conventional understanding of the rule-of-law
ideal focuses principally on constraints on official decision-making.  A
government of laws is one in which official action is governed by pre-
existing legal rules of sufficient clarity and generality that they are ca-
pable of precluding the arbitrary whim of individuals or the brute im-
positions of power.  Thus, the rule-of-law ideal is closely entwined
with law’s traditional tendency toward formalism.  This, for example,
is the view promoted in Justice Scalia’s well-known article The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules,38 which insists that standards, totality of cir-
cumstances, and multi-factor balancing tests are not “‘law,’ properly
If the Department of Justice were to make even a pretense of reaching every probable
violation of federal law, ten times its present staff will be inadequate.  We know that
no local police force can strictly enforce the traffic laws, or it would arrest half the
driving population on any given morning.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3 (1973) (“[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primar-
ily for its benefit.”).
34. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176.  The described action is barred by 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(1)(B) (1994).
35. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176-77.
36. See id. at 177.
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  The origins of the phrase trace
back to Aristotle by way of James Harrington.  See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court,
1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1986) (quoting
JAMES HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES
HARRINGTON 170 (J. Pocock ed., 1977)).
38. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
The relationship between Justice Scalia’s narrow view of rules, his Article III jurisprudence, and
his plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), is discussed in my essay,
Making the Familiar Conventional Again, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2001).
II - WHAT IF JUSTICE SCALIA - WINTER.DOC 05/09/01  1:56 PM
162 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 12:155
speaking.”39  Second, and relatedly, the rule-of-law ideal insists that
no one be above the law; even the highest officials are subject to legal
strictures.40  Third (and this is the more general principle of which the
previous is a corollary), the rule-of-law ideal maintains that every
person is governed by the same law without regard to status or per-
son: “Equal justice under law”—that is, one law for rich and poor,
black and white, gentleman and commoner alike.
But there is another, often overlooked dimension of the rule-of-
law ideal that emphasizes the ordinariness of law.  Thus, in his classic
formulation of the rule of law, A.V. Dicey identified as well the qual-
ity of ordinary law administered by ordinary tribunals.41  This is the
sense in which great issues of constitutional law can be raised and de-
termined in an ordinary trespass action, as in Entick v. Carrington42 or
Luther v. Borden,43 or a simple action for assault, as (more notori-
ously) was the case in Dred Scott v. Sandford.44  It is the sense in
which we recognize the rule of law as vindicated when General Pino-
chet is detained by regular municipal police officers acting on the
authority of an arrest warrant issued by the Bow Street magistrates’
court, one of London’s local criminal courts.45
This sense, I want to insist, is no contingent feature of the rule-
of-law ideal but a central and constitutive dimension.  Consider an-
other aspect of the paradox of constitutional democracy: “In a consti-
tutional democracy,” Michel Rosenfeld points out, “the rule of law on
the one hand depends on the state for its implementation and en-
forcement while, on the other hand, it serves as the citizen’s most le-
39. Scalia, supra note 38, at 1182.  A discussion and critique of this view can be found in
Chapter 8 of my book, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE & MIND (forthcoming Sept.
2001).
40. Cf. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 324 (1975):
If laws can attain the status of reason . . . then laws must rule and not men. . . .  But the
argument is in danger of becoming circular: laws ensure that reason rules and not par-
ticular passions, but they are invented and maintained by men and can prevail only
when men are guided by reason to the public good and not by passion to private ends.
The laws must maintain themselves, then, regulating the behavior of the men who
maintain them. . . .
41. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
179-92 (1908).
42. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
43. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
45. Maurice Chittenden, Pinochet Held by London Police on Murder Charges, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), October 18, 1998, at 1.
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gitimate and effective weapon against the state.”46  The citizen would
be up the creek without the proverbial paddle were it not for the
commitment of ordinary courts to apply ordinary law without regard
to the official status of even the highest governmental actors.  Ordi-
nary law administered by ordinary tribunals even in extraordinary
cases.
It is this dimension of the rule-of-law ideal that I wish to contrast
with Justice Scalia’s wholly ahistorical suggestion that Article II con-
fers on the Executive the exclusive power to vindicate the rule of law.
What is striking about this position is its elitist and deeply authori-
tarian character.  Only the President and his immediate subordinates
are authorized to enforce the law.  One can almost hear him, in a
deadpan paraphrase of McMurphy’s mocking comment in One Flew
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest: “Anybody enforcing the law whenever they
feel like it? Why, why, . . . that would be anarchy!”47  For Justice
Scalia, the idea that a lowly citizen with no interest other than a pas-
sion for justice might stand before the bar of the court and invoke the
majesty of the law against a public wrongdoer is a kind of sacrilege to
be condemned; it is the exploitation of the high mission of the law for
merely personal gain.  “Thus,” he says, “is a public fine diverted to a
private interest.”48  Citizen suits, he continues, represent “the use of
public remedies for private wrongs.”49
His, then, is an imperial vision of the law that leaves us—the citi-
zens and ostensible rulers—as its passive and alienated subjects.  To
be clear, it is not just that this vision has no room for a citizen’s
standing to insist upon the public’s interest in the faithful execution of
the law.  It is rather that this view treats such plainly other-regarding
action as a transgression: the hijacking of a public right for private
purposes.  Should one of us have the temerity to take legal action—to
insist that it is our air, our water, our law—she will be greeted with
the kind of condemnation usually reserved for the antisocial: stranger,
officious intermeddler, special interest, protection racket, corruption.
46. Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy 4
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
47. KEN KESEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST 84-85 (1962) (Upon being told
that the toothpaste is kept under lock-and-key until 6:45 because “it’s ward policy,” McMurphy
exclaims: “You’re saying people’d be brushin’ their teeth whenever the spirit moved them. . . .
And, lordy can you imagine?  Teeth bein’ brushed at six-thirty, six-twenty—who can tell?
maybe even six o’clock.  Yeah, I can see your point”).
48. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 210 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. See id.
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Given this attitude, it is instructive (if not a little amusing) to
watch Justice Scalia struggle with the dissonance in his opinion for the
Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens.50  “[T]he long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the
American Colonies” and their prevalence “in the period immediately
before and after the framing of the Constitution” make the “history
well nigh conclusive” on the constitutional question of the informer’s
standing.51  Hamstrung by history, Justice Scalia is at a loss to square
the informer action with the notion of private interest that undergirds
his Article III jurisprudence.  Recall that, in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, he had suggested that the Congress “created a concrete pri-
vate interest in the outcome . . . by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious [informer].”52  But, he is forced to reject that analysis here:
“the same might be said of someone who has placed a wager upon the
outcome.”53  Moreover, in Steel Company, Justice Scalia had held that
“an interest that is merely a ‘byproduct’ of the suit itself cannot give
rise to a cognizable injury in fact.”54  So, too, Justice Scalia observes
that it “would perhaps suffice to say that the relator here is simply the
statutorily designated agent of the United States,” but then concludes
that this “analysis is precluded by the fact that the statute gives the
relator himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely the right to
retain a fee out of the recovery.”55  Instead, he determines—without
explanation—that the informer’s standing can be based on “the doc-
trine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in
fact suffered by the assignor.”56  He reasons that the False Claims Act
“can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the
Government’s damages claim.”57
Though a delightful legal fiction, the assignment gambit is for
three reasons quite unreasonable.  First, the doctrine upon which Jus-
tice Scalia relies concerns the standing of commercial assignees of
50. 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
51. Id. at 1863-65.
52. See 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
53. See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1862 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573).  Thus, he ex-
plains that: “[a]n interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff standing. . . .
The interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally
protected right.”  120 S. Ct. at 1862.
54. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).
55. Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1862.
56. Id. at 1863.
57. Id.
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business enterprises and other such property interests.58  In all those
cases, the assignee—who, one would assume, paid good money for
the assets at issue—had at stake bona fide financial interests that pre-
existed (i.e., were not merely the byproduct of) the lawsuit itself.
Second, it is difficult to see how the assignment fiction avoids the Ar-
ticle II objection Justice Scalia first raised in Lujan and repeated in
Steel Company and Laidlaw—by “assigning” the right to enforce a
governmental “damages claim,” “Congress has done precisely what
we have said it cannot do: convert an ‘undifferentiated public interest’
into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts.”59  Third, there is
nothing in the lengthy history of the informer action that even sug-
gests the assignment theory.  Quite the contrary, the informer was
merely one of several kinds of relators authorized to “see that a pub-
lic offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public griev-
ance be remedied.”60  Indeed, in 1875, the Court explicitly recognized
the right of the relator to sue “to enforce a public duty, not due to the
government as such.”61  Obviously, the government cannot assign
rights or duties to which it has no claim.  Yet, the Hall Court had no
problem either with the constitutionality of the statute authorizing
suit in that case nor with the right of the relators to pursue the action
in the absence of any demonstrated personal interest.
Justice Scalia’s Vermont Agency decision may follow the dictates
of history, but it does not understand its lesson: Citizens are neither
agents nor assigns of the government; they are—that is, we are—its
principal.  Citizen suits, therefore, stand on a different conceptual and
constitutional footing than actions asserting mere private rights.  Jus-
tice Scalia treats informer actions anachronistically in terms of a
modern understanding that recognizes only the polar extremes of, on
one hand, self-interested private action and, on the other, public in-
terest pursued by the official organs of an exclusive authority.  But
this is the very understanding that pits self-rule against the rule of
law.  The lesson instantiated in the historical practice of the citizen’s
58. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (assignee of defunct UHF
station brought antitrust action against businesses that allegedly conspired to put the station out
of business); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950) (as-
signee of patent licenses brought suit for royalty payments); Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U.S. 474
(1898) (assignee of bank loans).
59. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561;
Steel Co. 523 U.S. at 106).
60. See People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
61. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875).
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suit is that, in a democratic legal order, there should be no jurisdic-
tional line separating the rulers from the ruled.
This was the view of earlier generations of Americans more alert
to the values of citizen participation.  “[W]here the object is the en-
forcement of a public right,” wrote one nineteenth century court, “the
People are regarded as the real party, and the relator need not show
that he has any legal interest in the result. It is enough that he is in-
terested, as a citizen, in having the laws executed, and the right in
question enforced.”62  For these earlier generations, democracy and
the rule of law were not in tension because the rule of law was a
common, public good to be employed democratically by the citizenry
at large.  And they were quite right to see it thus.  For the vision of
the rule of law as ordinary law invoked by ordinary people is a vision
of law as a leveling agent.  No one above the law and everyone, even
the least amongst us, able to use its power to unsettle the wealthy and
the powerful.  The popular actions of these earlier generations are,
rightly, the historical antecedents of Roberto Unger’s notion of de-
stabilization rights,63 the noble legal implements of a constitutional
democracy more radical and, in some ways, more democratic than our
own.
62. County Comm’rs v. People ex rel. Metz, 11 Ill. 202, 207-08 (1849).  See supra note 13.
63. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530-35 (1987); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 39, 52-56 (1986).
